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Abstract
Despite of strict policies implementation since late of 1980s, issue of influx of undocumented migrants has been a 
continuing concern for the Malaysian government. As the problem has been gradually securitized and reconstituted as
a security issue symbolized by the conduct of massive operasi accompanied by a volunteer-based paramilitary force
known as People s Volunteer Corps (RELA), the status of undocumented migrants in Malaysia has become a 
problem for maintaining human security. While increasing insecuritization of the plight of undocumented migrants
under the fear of operations in Malaysia, there is frequently alleged rhetoric of the sukarelawan (volunteer) which has
been functioning to legitimize the brutality caused by RELA personnel during the operations. Moreover, at the back 
of emphasizing threat of undocumented migrants and making progress in expanding its registered members as well as
organizational authority, RELA has been utilizing the condition of insecurity, particularly with the correlation of 
election strategy pursued by the ruling party coalition called Barisan Nasional, being questioned for functioning as a 
political machine to collect wider supports in order to maintain regime security by major opposition parties.
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1. Introduction 
As shown in the current status of ethnic balance, the phenomenon of migration influx has been 
historically entangled to the social development in Malaysia. This is especially concerning the case of 
immigrants influx from Indonesia. According to the Malaysian Ministry of Human Resources, Indonesian 
workers dominate about half of approximately 2,109,954 foreign workers are currently working in 
Malaysia [1]. The strong connectivity between two countries also lead to the increase of undocumented 
migrants in Malaysia. Often represented as public enemy  by Malaysian enforcements, enhance of 
undocumented migrants have been increasingly treated in terms of threat to national security. While the 
Malayisian government has been handling the problem of undocumented migrants in terms of security 
issue since 1990s, this has provoked international criticisms as well as causing diplomatic tentions among 
sending countries occassionaly. Since  independence in 1957, Malaysian national security has 
developed inseparably from the comprehensiveness of its target as well as participant involved. People s 
Volunteer Corps Malaysia (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat Malaysia), commonly known as RELA, has also 
developed along this historical background since its establishment in February 1972.  While RELA was 
primarily organized in order to monitor communist insurgency, after the demise of Communist Party of 
Malaya (CPM), the force has shifted the target to undocumented migrants particulary since 1990s. 
Although RELA has been frequently mobilized in crackdowns against undocumented migrants initiated 
by Malaysian immigration department, the auxiliary force has been a target of criticism for cases which 
involve mistreatment of migrants including abuse of power during operations.  
With this background in mind, this paper examines the political dynamics sustaining threat perception 
against the continuing influx of undocumented migrants in Malaysia. While there have been numerous 
studies which focused on the dynamics of immigration flows, only a few attempts have been made to 
describe political motives that facilitate the construction of threat perception against undocumented 
migrants in Malaysia. Base on materials collected through interviews with high-ranks in security agencies 
under the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kementerian Dalam Negeri), the focal point of this article is to 
consider political dimension of security practice conducted against undocumented migrants under the 
involvement of RELA. Particularly tracing the historical development of RELA, this article discusses 
how the insecurity has been utilized as a political instrument with relation to the regime security. In 
addition, the social movements aimed to maintain the rights of migrants, including undocumented ones, 
and its current challenges will be discussed. 
 
2. Influx of Undocumented Migrants and Operasi in Malaysia 
 
As current situation of multi-ethnic background of Malaysian society highlights, the influx of migration is 
not a new phenomenon in Malaysia. Development of agriculture and mining facilitated influx of Chinese 
and Indian workers starting from 1890, and reaching its apex in 1920s [2]. As already mentioned in 
previous study, between the late 1950s and early 1960s, influx of Indonesian migrants into then Malaya 
was rather welcomed by Kuala Lumpur in order to maintain Malays  supremacy of ethnic balance over 
non-Malays [3]. The influx of migrants was further driven by introduction of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) which started in 1971 together with the Second Malaysian Plan (1971-1975), and economic 
development achieved through 1980s. As an official attempt to control the movement of migrant workers, 
Indonesia and Malaysia signed the Medan Pact on May 12, 1984. The aim of the pact was to mitigate the 
flow of undocumented migrants and prevent exploitation of workers by tracking the flow of migrants [4]. 
Furthermore, Malaysian government s attempt to enhance surveillance illegal entry was fallowed by the 
establishment of a task force in 1985. In spite of these earlier efforts, it did not bring significant result to 
curb the number of undocumented migrants in Malaysia.  
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It is from the beginning of 1990s that Malaysian government introduced massive crackdowns to 
prevent migrants from illegal entry as well as arrest those staying without valid legal status. Operasi Nyah 
 was introduced in 1992 in order to strengthen border surveillance to prevent illegal entries. Following 
this was implementation of Operasi Nyah from July, which aims to round up undocumented migrants 
staying illegally in Malaysia. The latter resulted in arresting 136,876 by the time of December 1995 [5]. 
The massive operations generally take place after certain period of amnesty program which legalizes 
undocumented migrants already in the country. For an instance, the most recent amnesty program started 
in August 2011 ended legalizing 480,995 undocumented migrants [6].  
Despite the introduction of massive operations in 1990s, arrest of undocumented migrants continued, 
especially from Indonesia. At the end of 2001, between 60 and 80% of detainees in immigration detention 
centres were dominated by Indonesians and Malaysian government was reportedly facing a situation of 
deporting approximately 1,000 of them to Indonesia every week [7]. The threat perception against 
undocumented migrants in Malaysia was further bolstered by foreign workers  riots occurred through the 
period of 2000s. Following the sequential riots caused by foreign workers especially from Indonesia, in 
January 2002, Prime Minister Mahathir expressed his thought on the necessity of replacing Indonesian 
workers to foreign workers from other countries [8]. The incident has led Malaysian government to 
deport undocumented migrants to their home country. 350,000 undocumented migrants have passed 
through the island of Nunukan located between the border of Tawau and East Kalimantan, with 70 deaths 
said to have occurred lacking the sufficient coordination and preparation among the government agencies 
of Indonesia and Malaysia. There was also an introduction of new immigration law-- the Immigration Act 
No. 1154-- in August of the same year, which imposes penalties of caning, fines, and imprison. The 
establishment of Special Immigration Courts between December 2006 and March 2007 evoked additional 
concern. The primary aim of setting up special courts in fourteen immigration detention centres was to 
speed up the process of trial in order to handle thousands of cases related to illegal migration. Riots 
caused by foreign workers also occurred inside the immigration detention centres. In April 2011, a total 
of 109 detainees of who were mostly Burmese escaped from the Lenggeng Detention Centre located at 
the south of Kuala Lumpur. At the centre, there was also a riot in April 2008 by sixty detainees after 
being denied their move to the third country. Approximately a hundred police and Federal Reserve Unit 
personnel and another hundred of RELA personnel were mobilized to control the situation [9]. As these 
historical transitions of Malaysian immigration policies illustrates, enormous number of undocumented 
migrant influx has been requiring Malaysian government to implement comprehensive measures which 
require enormous man power. Although RELA has been continuingly criticized for the abuse of power 
during operations, mainly due to the lack of manpower and the limitation of budget, the immigration 
department insists the necessity of mobilizing RELA in order to implement operations [10]. Throughout 
2010, 6,017 operations were exercised including small raids [11]. Although the number of operations was 
mitigated by the implementation of amnesty program in 2011, it still counted 4,156 with the involvement 
of 24,520 personnel from several law enforcement agencies, including RELA [12].   
While the estimated number of undocumented migrants significantly varies depending on resources, 
RELA estimates that there are same number as that of legal foreign workers which is approximately two 
millions [13]. Added to this, as Malaysia is not a signatory country of the UN Convention on the Status of 
Refugees and its Protocol, legal status of refugees and asylum seekers also falls into the category of 
undocumented migrants which makes their social position vulnerable in many situations. This has also 
preventing UNHCR from making full effort for the protection of refugees. For an instance, just before 
conducting massive operations in 2005, then Deputy Prime Minister Najib insisted there will be no 
distinction between illegal immigrants and holders of UNHCR letters [14]. While it bears noting that 
there seems to be a slight improvement in the stance of Malaysian government in handling the issue of 
refugees and asylum seekers, they are continuingly facing predicaments including being caught during 
operations.  
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3. Historical Development of RELA 
 
Despite of rising concern against the continuing involvement in Malaysian immigration policies, 
RELA has been successful in maintaining its presence as the third security force in Malaysia. There are 
currently 2. 95 millions personnel registered, including 1,200 fulltime officers occupied by ex-military 
and ex-police officers. The volunteer personnel receive social insurance by registrations and the payment 
of 4 ringgit per hour for participating in activities. The historical development of RELA has its root in the 
Home Guard established during the time of Emergency, when the threat of communism was at stake for 
Malaysian national security.  
Before the establishment of RELA, it was the Home Guard which was mobilized to mitigate the 
penetration of the communism in Malaysia. In June 1950, Sir Harold Briggs begins resettlement policy 
against Chinese living in Malaysia. Accompanied by police, the Home Guard monitored the plight of 
New Villages, where many of the Chinese were resettled in order to cut any sorts of contacts between the 
participants of CPM. At the end of 1950, the Home Guard held approximately 30,000 personnel of whom 
25,400 were Malay, though included 3,500 Chinese and 800 Indians respectively [15]. While the Home 
Guard played crucial, though unspectacular, role to deter the penetration of communism, the force was 
disbanded at the end of 1959. The Home Guard killed 225 terrorists and captured 23, while the damage 
was 237 killed and 59 wounded during the period of Emergency [16]. The discussion over the creation of 
armed vigilante arose again in the middle of 1960s, then Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak 
proclaiming Our aim is to train as many people as possible  [17]. To the lesser extent, the movement of 
Konfrontasi in Indonesia which targeted Malaysia during 1963-1966 also boosted realization of 
strengthening national security.  
Despite the result of decreasing number of communists in Malaysia through the Emergency period, 
activities of CPM still remained, particularly around Thai border. It was for this reason that the Home 
Guard was reorganized and transformed into RELA in January 1972 with the effect of Essential Rules 
(Ikatan Relawan Rakyat) 1966. As an agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs, RELA has developed 
relying on the spirit of volunteerism. What characterizes security policies in Malaysia is its 
comprehensiveness of threat perception as well as participants which is illustrated in the concept of 
KESBAN. It first introduced in 1971 facing the second communist insurgency, emphasizes the 
importance of socio-economic factors in order to maintain national security [18]. In this sense, RELA has 
traditionally been involved inseparably from social development. While the policies against communism 
were mainly led by police force during the first Emergency, it is also worth noticing that Malaysian army 
was significantly strengthened during 1970s [19]. At the time of October 1973, 15,430 personnel were 
registered to the Home Guard in peninsula Malaysia. Adding to the role of protecting villagers residing in 
border areas, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced to increase the member to 50,000 in six months 
aiming not only to strengthen its security capability but to facilitate the national development especially in 
rural areas [20]. In September 1975, the Prime Minister Tun Razak expressed his concern against the 
situation of New Emergency . In fact, at the time of the middle of 1975, estimated 2054 members of 
communists were still active near the Thai border, comprised of Thai dominating over a half [ 21]. There 
were also attacks to headquarters of the Police Field Force. Numbers of police and security force were 
injured and killed. Under this circumstance, the middle of 1970s saw a boost of the localization of 
Malaysian national security policy. The patrolling activities conducted by RELA were also complemented 
by rukun tetangga, groups of local district.  
Trilateral dialogue between Malaysia, Thailand and CPM which began in 1985 brought the result of 
ceasefire agreement in December 1989. Diminish of the threat of communism also meant the emergence 
of a new challenge for RELA as a security force. In this background, throughout the first half of 1990s, 
discussion arose particularly focusing on the necessity of continuing presence of RELA for Malaysian 
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security. In April 1994, Menteri Besar of Perlis Dr. Abdul Hamid Pawanteh contended that since there 
was no existential threat to Malaysian society, RELA should focus more on community based welfare 
activities in order to prove their worth [22]. The ambiguity of organizational identity appears to have been 
well recognized by the officers of RELA themselves. In October of the same year, National Security 
Council s deputy secretary Ramli Abdul Rahman, who was RELA s Director-General for eight years, 
insisted the necessity of formulating new strategies to ensure RELA remained respected  [23].  
Undoubtedly, it was in this background that RELA s involvement in security operations intensifies. 
Crackdowns against undocumented migrants usually take place after receiving complaints from locals. 
RELA and other security forces are mobilized whenever the immigration department judges the lack of 
personnel to conduct operations through investigations [24]. With the organizational philosophy of 
sukarelawan (volunteerism), it can not be denied that RELA has been continuingly contributing to the 
development in Malaysia, particularly through many types of community services called Projek Bakti in 
recent years, there have always been sceptical arguments about RELA s expanding role at the same time. 
This is especially the case for the massive crackdowns which have been a source of diplomatic tension 
and controversy particularly with Indonesia since the middle of 2000s. In the context of presence in 
Malaysian immigration policy, the year of 2005 brought a watershed for the organizational development 
of RELA. In March 2005, Operasi Tegas was launched with enormous number of officers from the 
immigration department, police, National Registration Department and Prison, RELA, and rukun 
tetangga. It is before the implementation of operations that the government swiftly strengthen authority of 
RELA. In accordance with the Essential (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat) (Amendment) Regulations 2005, 
RELA volunteers were given authority to 
terrorist, undesirable person, illegal immigrant or an occupier, to stop that person in order to make all 
such inquiries or to require the production of all such documents or other things as the competent 
The Regulations also allowed volunteers to enter and search any 
premises, public or private, without a search warrant, to bear firearms, and to demand documents from 
members of the public, provided the appropriate RELA officials give approval.  
Facing the implementation of Operasi Tegas, Indonesian government sent eight television stations and 
12 politicians to monitor the procedure of raids against undocumented migrants. Added to this, prior to 
the operation, then President Yudhoyono sent a letter asking for humanitarian treatment of Indonesian 
undocumented migrants. The government and human rights organizations in Indonesia were not alone to 
show concerns against massive crackdowns. The government of the Philippines, as well, alleged for 
treatment against undocumented migrants, though sent an official letter showing gratitude for careful 
treatment of undocumented migrants afterward. Although Indonesian government response was rather 
moderate, Indonesian civil society organizations were quick to problem the issue of large scale operations 
enhanced by the presence of RELA. In March 2005, KOPBUMI, a Jakarta-based advocacy group 
working for the rights of migrants, brought the issue of migrant workers to the UN Commission of 
Human Rights alleging the need of ceasing the massive seizure taken against Indonesian workers. In 2007, 
several Indonesian politicians also called for withdraw of Indonesian ambassador in Kuala Lumpur to 
appeal strong concern against the plight of ill-treatment of Indonesian migrant workers. In Indonesia, the 
public outcry was intensified when a wife of Indonesian diplomat was arrested and detained by RELA 
personnel in October 2007. As the numbers of cases of power abuse caused by RELA personnel provoked, 
the force was prohibited to conduct operations against undocumented migrants without being 
accompanied by immigration department.   
The counter-discourses against RELA s involvement in security operations against undocumented 
migrants are steadily increasing and constituted by several aspects. Firstly, appropriateness of security 
force base on volunteer members being involved in security practices has been covertly questioned from 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International as well as non-government 
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organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). Until recently, the conditions for the 
registration had been only a few, which are to be Malaysian citizen aged 16 for female and 18 for male, 
though this was raised to the age of 18 in May 2012 as will be described below. As the size of registered 
grew significantly, RELA has shortened the period of basic training program from 10 days to 7 days in 
2010. While the program includes a class for learning about basic human rights which is conducted by 
officers of the National Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM), it is obvious that incidents of power 
abuses caused by RELA members during operations and other patrolling activities is an outgrowth of the 
lack of sufficient training process.  
Secondly, RELA has been criticized for the miss treatment of undocumented migrants holding UN 
cards. Although there are nearly 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers, as Malaysia is not a signatory 
country of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, refugees and 
asylum seekers lacks sufficient legal status. Moreover, Malaysian enforcements have been accused of 
making arrests during operations. It is in this context that some of the international organizations have 
been critical to the form of massive operations with the involvement of RELA. In 2009, Human Rights 
Watch sent a letter to ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, addressing the involvement of RELA to 
the security operations and violation of human rights. Likewise, Amnesty International made a policy 
recommendation to displace RELA from all kinds of Malaysian immigration policies in a report 
published in 2010 [ 25 ]. Apart from these critical allegations, the organizational philosophy of 
has been giving members of RELA a unique position as a security force, legitimizing 
security practice without taking responsibility.  
Added to the issue of undocumented migrants, RELA has been eager to involve in other patrolling and 
surveillance activities. Currently, members of RELA are also deployed for monitoring of illegal 
smuggling along Thai border, patrolling in immigration detention centres and patrolling crime hot spots 
accompanied by police and other enforcement forces, which is known as Rondaan 1 Malaysia  under 
the Government Transformation Programme. With the development of various policing programs, the 
Home Minister Seri Hishamuddin Tun Hussein emphasizes that RELA has been contributing to the 
government success story on crime  [26]. What needs to be emphasized here is that in order to maintain 
organizational identity as a security agency, there has to be a threat to encounter. In this context, as can be 
illustrated as a patchwork of insecurity , RELA has been widely adding the source of social dangers to 
maintain and stabilize the organizational identity as the third security force in Malaysia. As Didier Bigo 
observes, the process of securitization should be seen as entrenched to the process of insecuritization of 
daily life, constructing new dangers and connecting them to one another [27]. It is also worth noticing that 
the practice of securitization, whatever the target is, can be legitimized and further sustained by using 
objective data of which Villumsen Berling calls the objective aura of science.  [28]. With this aura of 
science, interacted with public fear, the negative impacts securitization act contains (in this case, stern 
actions against undocumented migrants) can easily be overlooked or tolerated by the majority of public. 
Furthermore, mobilization of scientific facts entails effect of limiting the room for counter-discourse. 
While the government has been confident in reducing crimes, in July 2012, former Inspector-General of 
Police Musa Hassan accused the government for manipulating crime rates. Just before this allegation had 
been raised, the Performance Management & Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), a unit under the Prime 
, released a statistic showing country s crime index fell by 10.1 % between January 
and May 2012. This has caused wider dispute over the link between crime index and public perception 
against the fear of crimes. 
As 2012 is the 40th year since the establishment of RELA, there has also been an attempt to clarify and 
establish RELA s organizational presence in Malaysian society. In June 2012, the Malaysia Volunteers 
Corps Act 2012 came into operations. With this act, condition for the enrolment has been raised to the age 
of 18 for both men and female. Although RELA remains to involve in immigration policies, in 
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accordance with the new act, existing power to carry fire arms and to make arrests had been banned. 
While this might contribute to reduce the abuse of authority by members of RELA, another issue of 
concern still remains. Apart from the concern of the protection of human rights of migrant workers, 
RELA has been accused for being machinery to maintain the security of present political regime 
dominated by Barisan Nasional (BN). In the next section, the underlying political motives of RELA s 
recent expansion will be focused.    
 
4. The Politics of Insecurity and Utilization of the Fear of Crimes 
 
While RELA has been increasingly involving in maintaining security against undocumented migrants 
since 1990s and expanding targets to other criminal issues in recent years, there is also another dimension 
of security in which RELA has correlation. It is security of the political regime lead by Malay-based 
political party UMNO. As Jef Huysmans notes, it is important to bear in mind that the insecurity is 
essential part of pursuing security strategies [29]. The necessity of danger, therefore, is inevitably 
entangled to the practice of securitization making of enemy. In this sense, it is important to focus not 
only on the surface of how security policies are made and implemented but also on the political factors 
that sustains security practice against undocumented migrants and legitimizes RELA s involvement 
despite of criticisms.  
     As John Funston acutely points out, along with the development of rukun tetangga, RELA has been 
historically mobilized to gain public royalty against state apparatus [30]. According to his observation, 
under the New Emergency, RELA members were also given mandate to monitor student demonstrations 
in 1974 and had been advised not to participate in these anti-government activities. As mentioned above, 
full time officers in RELA are dominated by ex-military and ex-police officers. It is worth noticing that 
Malaysian military and, to a lesser extent, Malaysian police, have developed based on the dominance of 
Malays. The tendency of Malay-dominance in Malaysian security forces thus directly leads to Malay-
dominance among officers of RELA, particularly with the high-ranks. Added to the anxious concern 
expressed from the perspective of human security, this has brought major opposition parties  sceptical 
view of the possibility of RELA being utilized for the present regime security. It was after the 12th 
General Election in 2008 that the number of registered RELA members markedly increased, in which BN 
drastically lost its popular vote and obtained only 49% in Peninsula Malaysia. This correlation of BN s 
electoral failure in the General Election and drastic expansion aftermath has been a problem as an attempt 
to undermine free and fair election. For an instance, Teresa Kok, a member of parliament from the 
Democratic Action Party (DAP), questions sudden increase of RELA members (543,375 in 2008 to 
2,593,263 in 2010), insisting the possibility of the government recruiting to gain support for BN in the 
upcoming general election [31]. While the Election Commission has continuingly explained that RELA 
will not be qualified for postal voting, similar criticism and concern against RELA members to be 
mobilized as postal voters have been also raised by major opposition parties such as People s Justice 
Party (PKR) and Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), as well as by Bersih 2.0, a coalition of NGOs and 
opposition parties [32]. Furthermore, Bersih 2.0 issued a media statement titled RELA must not be 
exploited for political gains  in April 2011, criticizing a reportedly incident that the chief-minister of 
Sarawak asked RELA members to be loyal to government by ensuring BN candidates  victory in state 
elections which took place in April 2011 [33]. It will be clear from these allegations that recent expansion 
of RELA has been questioned not only from the humanitarian perspective but also from the electoral 
perspective.    
In January 2012, an assembly was held to celebrate 40th year of RELA s establishment. At the 
assembly, speaking in front of an estimated 20,000 RELA personnel, Prime Minister Seri Najib Razak 
indicated the possibility of mobilizing RELA against mass demonstration [34]. Although RELA was not 
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deployed to control BERSIH 3.0 which took place in July 2012, a mass demonstration calling primarily 
for free and fair election, the statement by Najib indicates the correlation between RELA and the regime 
security.  
 
5. Maintaining and Prioritizing Human Security 
 
With the situation of undocumented migrants living in the fear of raids, expansion of RELA has not 
only been criticized by human rights organizations or local NGOs and CSOs but also by major opposition 
parties from the perspective of free and fair elections. While both parties shares concern against RELA s 
expanding role, fundamental difference of interests between the two aspects should not be overlooked. 
While it cannot be denied that RELA s recent development has been criticized by various types of 
organizations, this is also leading to create difficulty in making consolidated movement for maintaining 
human security of those living under the fear of massive operations and to coordinate concrete policy to 
protect their human rights. 
The serious obstacle that critics of government s migration policies face is the limitation of 
information access. SUARAM (Suara Rakyat Malaysia), one of the most active human rights advocacy 
group established in 1987, is not an exception. SUARAM has not been able to get an opportunity to 
directly discuss the issue of controversial massive operation with enforcement agencies including RELA, 
thus alternatively has been mobilizing strong links between politicians in order to pull out information 
from the government by questioning in the Parliament [35]. Facing this situation, there is a tendency of 
officers of NGOs to take up a new course as politicians. While the tendency will bring some interests to 
NGOs, at least in terms of easy access to information, this is not a phenomenon without risk in terms of 
creating well-balanced relation between civil society and state in Malaysia. As Meredith Weiss warns as 
the risk of creeping partisanship  [36], the intrusion of civil society activists into political arena contains 
danger to undermine the fundamental role of which civil society is counted to play.  
At the multinational level and especially in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
dialogue on the creation of law-binding mechanism for the protection of migrant workers has been 
discouraged predominantly by the different stance on the treatment of undocumented migrants between 
sending countries and receiving countries. This tendency is clearly indicated by the status of ratification 
of the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants and 
Members of Their Family. Among ASEAN member states, only Indonesia and the Philippines have 
ratified the convention. Although ASEAN has managed to agree on the ASEAN s Declaration on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers in 2007, the lack of agreement among 
sending countries and receiving countries has been giving an impression of ASEAN doing business as 
usual.  While one of Indonesian official insists that Indonesia s top priority on the construction of 
ASEAN Community should be to establish legal framework to protect all migrant workers [37], there is 
no doubt that this will not be an easy task under the circumstance of lacking fundamental consensus.  
Although the discussion on the protection of migrant rights slows down at the ASEAN official level as 
well as bilateral government level, there is an interesting institutional development at middle level 
between regional and national levels. This is indicated by the establishment of South East Asia National 
Human Rights Institutions Forum (SEANF), a coalition of national human rights commissions comprised 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Timor Leste and Thailand. During recent years, SEANF eagers to 
promote human rights including the protection of migrant workers through policy recommendations to 
both regional institutions such as ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 
and SEANF member states. One of a participant from SUHAKAM insists that, unlike ASEAN official 
track-1 network facing enduring divide between sending countries and receiving country of migrants, 
there is no sensitivity in SEANF discussing the human rights protection of migrants including 
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undocumented ones [38]. While the institutional framework is relatively new, it is possible to say that 
SEANF s unofficial character has potential capability to provide impetus to mitigate discourse of fear 
against undocumented  domestically in receiving countries and also facilitate increase of human 
discourse at regional level. 
In summary, relying on the strong social effect of the discourse of dangers, RELA has managed to 
maintain, and further sustain organizational authority since the period of emergency. While it is clear that 
RELA has been contributing to tackle the issue of undocumented migrants complementary, there is a 
possibility of RELA being machinery to maintain support for the ruling political party UMNO and to 
protect present political regime lead by BN. While there is diversification of counter-discourse against 
RELA s expansion in recent years, this is posing a dilemma for the NGOs and CSOs to concentrate and 
prior the protection of human rights for undocumented migrants.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Despite the difficult circumstance under the coercive political regime, it cannot be denied that the social 
movement to foster the protection undocumented migrants in Malaysia has been gradually developing in 
recent years. However, regardless of vagueness of organizational identity after the de-securitization of 
 threat in 1989 and enduring criticisms against involvement in raids against undocumented 
migrants, RELA has survived for 40 years and maintained its organizational identity as the third security 
force in Malaysia. Combined with the role of volunteering activities for social development, Director 
General of RELA shows his confidence in the role of RELA in Malaysian society [39]. In which way will 
RELA be developing in the context of Malaysian security is open to question. While the efforts to 
improve RELA s organizational image as volunteer force serving nation have been seen, as sceptical view 
against RELA still remains strong inside and outside of Malaysia, it will be task requiring long time effort 
to accomplish.   
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